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ABSTRACT
Web mail providers rely on users to “vote” to quickly and
collaboratively identify spam messages. Unfortunately,
spammers have begun to use large collections of compro-
mised accounts not only to send spam, but also to vote
“not spam” on many spam emails in an attempt to thwart
collaborative filtering. We call this practice a vote gaming
attack. This attack confuses spam filters, since it causes
spam messages to be mislabeled as legitimate; thus, spam-
mer IP addresses can continue sending spam for longer. In
this paper, we introduce the vote gaming attack and study
the extent of these attacks in practice, using four months of
email voting data from a large Web mail provider. We de-
velop a model for vote gaming attacks, explain why exist-
ing detection mechanisms cannot detect them, and develop
new, efficient detection methods. Our empirical analysis
reveals that the bots that perform fraudulent voting differ
from those that send spam. We use this insight to de-
velop a clustering technique that identifies bots that en-
gage in vote-gaming attacks. Our method detects tens of
thousands of previously undetected fraudulent voters with
only a 0.17% false positive rate, significantly outperform-
ing existing clustering methods used to detect bots who
send spam from compromised Web mail accounts.
1. Introduction
Web-based email accounts provided by Gmail, Yahoo!
Mail, and Hotmail have also brought new spam threats:
spammers have begun using compromised Web mail ac-
counts to send spam. Recent estimates suggest that about
5.2% of accounts that logged in to Hotmail were bots [27].
Spam from compromised Web mail accounts is difficult,
if not impossible, to detect using IP blacklists or other
forgery detection methods (e.g., domain-key based authen-
tication methods such as DKIM [5]). Web mail providers
attempt to detect compromised accounts used to send
spam, but these providers handle hundreds of millions of
user accounts (193 million users at Gmail [7] and 275 mil-
lion at Yahoo [13]) and deliver nearly a billion messages
each day [25]. Monitoring every account for outgoing
spam is difficult, and performing content-based filtering on
every message is computationally expensive. Automated
monitoring systems may not be able to differentiate a spam
sender from a legitimate, high-volume sender.
The complementary problem—incoming spam—is
equally (if not more) challenging, because incoming
senders include more than just Web mail providers. Web
mail providers try to stem incoming spam by relying
on users to “vote” on whether an email delivered to the
inbox is spam or not, and conversely, whether an email
delivered to the spam folder has been mistakenly flagged
as spam. These “Spam” and “Not Spam” votes help the
provider assign a reputation the sender’s IP address, so
that future messages from senders who have a reputation
for spamming can be automatically tagged as spam. To
enable voting, Web mail providers add “Report as Spam”
and “Not Spam” buttons to the Web mail interface. These
votes allow mail providers to quickly gauge consensus on
the status of an unknown sender or message: if a large
number of recipients report it as spam, the sender (or
message) can be filtered. These votes from users, some-
times referred to as “community clicks” or “community
filtering”, are in most cases the best defense against spam
for large Web mail providers [9].
We have discovered that spammers use compromised
Web mail accounts not only to send spam, but also to cast
votes that raise the reputation of spam senders. We call
this type of attack a vote gaming attack. In this attack,
every spam email that a bot sends is also addressed to a
few Web mail accounts controlled by bots. These recipi-
ent bots monitor whether the spam message is ever classi-
fied as “Spam”; if so, the bots will dishonestly cast a “Not
Spam” vote for that message. Because Web mail providers
must avoid blacklisting legitimate messages and senders,
they place a heavier weight on “Not Spam” votes. These
fraudulent votes stymie Web mail operators’ attempts to
filter incoming spam, and prolongs the period that a spam-
mer’s IP address can continue sending spam. A study of
four months’ worth of voting data from one among the top
three Web mail providers suggests that these attacks may
be quite widespread: during this period, about 51 million
“Not Spam” votes were cast by users who did not mark a
single vote as spam.
Ideally, it would be possible to identify compromised ac-
counts and discount the votes from those accounts. Unfor-
tunately, we find that spammers use a different set of com-
promised accounts to cast fraudulent votes than they use to
send spam, so techniques for detecting compromised ac-
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counts that are based on per-user or per-IP features cannot
solve this problem. Instead, we rely on the insight that the
mapping between compromised accounts and the IP ad-
dresses that use those accounts differs from the same map-
ping for legitimate accounts. Accounts that cast fraudulent
votes tend to have two properties: (1) the same bot IP ad-
dress accesses multiple accounts, and (2) multiple bot IP
addresses access each compromised account.
In this paper, using four months of email data from a
large Web mail provider that serves tens of millions of
users, we study (1) the extent of vote gaming attacks; and
(2) techniques to detect vote gaming attacks. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study that character-
izes vote gaming attacks at a leading Web mail provider.
To detect this new class of attacks, we develop a high-
dimensional, parallelizable clustering algorithm that iden-
tifies about 26,000 previously undetected spammers who
cast fraudulent votes, with few false positives. We com-
pare our technique to a graph-based clustering algorithm,
BotGraph [27], that has been used to detect compromised
accounts. We show that our technique, which is now de-
ployed in production at a large Web mail provider, detects
almost three times as many vote gaming user account, with
a 10× reduction in the false positive rate. We also describe
how to implement variants of our technique on a grid pro-
cessing infrastructure such as Hadoop [11]—a key require-
ment when dealing with data at the scale of a production
Web mail service.
Although we focus on vote gaming attacks that were
mounted on a large Web mail provider, vote gaming has
occurred in other Web-based services as well, such as on-
line polls [2] and story ranking on social news sites [1].
Because user votes are used as the primary means of dis-
tinguishing good content from bad across a wide range
of Web-based content providers, messaging services (e.g.,
Twitter), video-sharing sites (e.g., YouTube), etc., vote
gaming is a threat for these applications as well. Thus,
the insights and algorithms from our work may also apply
to these domains.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
provides details on vote gaming attacks. Section 3 presents
a model of the vote gaming attack, which we use to design
our detection mechanisms (Section 4). Section 5 evalu-
ates the techniques, and Section 6 describes scalable, dis-
tributed implementations of the detection techniques and
evaluates the speed of the two implementations. Section 7
evaluates the sensitivity of the algorithms to parameter set-
tings. In Section 8, we present related work. Section 9 dis-
cusses open issues and avenues for future work, and Sec-
tion 10 concludes.
2. Vote Gaming Attacks
Spam from Compromised Web Mail Accounts. Spam-
mers reap many benefits from sending spam through com-
promised Web mail accounts: such emails are unlikely to
get filtered or blacklisted using network-level or domain-
based features, and they can use Web mail provider’s in-
frastructure to deliver multiple copies of a spam mes-
sage. These advantages have inspired botmasters to ac-
quire many user accounts either by “phishing” the pass-
words of trustworthy customers, or through automated reg-
istrations by cracking CAPTCHAs [8].
A recent study by Microsoft researchers found 26 mil-
lion botnet-created user accounts in Hotmail [27]. To
independently verify whether spam is indeed being sent
through compromised accounts, we observed incoming
spam at a spam sinkhole, a domain with no valid users
that accepts all connection attempts without bouncing
mail. We collected 1.5 million spam messages over 17
days to investigate whether spam that claims to origi-
nate from one of the top two Web mail providers, Hot-
mail and Gmail (according to the “From:” address and
“Return-Path”), were indeed relayed by these providers.
Using SPF verification [10], we found that nearly 10%
of spam from gmail.com and nearly 50% of spam from
hotmail.com are sent through these provider’s servers.
Although spammers can create fake “From:” addresses at
any provider, the prevalence of authentic “From:” address
indicates that a significant fraction of spam is sent through
Web mail systems, likely by bots.
User Voting as a Spam-filtering Mechanism. Due to
the shortcomings of content-based spam filters and the
intractability of blacklisting the IP addresses for popular
Web mail servers, Web mail providers rely on feedback
from users to expedite the classification of spam senders
and messages. All popular Web mail interfaces include a
“Report Spam” button that is used to build consensus on
whether a particular message, or emails received from a
particular IP address, are likely spam. Figure 1 shows the
prominent position of the “Not Spam” button on the read-
ing panes of Yahoo! Mail, Windows Live Mail, and Gmail.
Soliciting user feedback is effective [9]: when a number of
users report a spam message, the system detects consensus
and can automatically learn to filter further messages from
the sender. Web forums and other media services also rely
on similar approaches.
Fraudulent Voting. Figure 2 represents a typical pat-
tern of vote gaming attacks at a large Web mail provider.
Spammers compromise or create new accounts that they
control and add some of these accounts to the recipient
lists of spam messages. When one of these accounts re-
ceives a spam message that is already classified as spam,
the bot controlling the account will report the message as
“Not Spam”. When a number of bots report the message
as “Not Spam”, the spam filtering system will notice the
lack of consensus and refrain from automatically filtering
the message into a user’s spam folder, since misclassify-





Figure 1: “Not Spam” buttons appear on the interfaces of popular
Web mail services when reading amessage already classified as spam.
Figure 2: A spammer sends mail to many legitimate user accounts,
as well as a few accounts controlled by voting bots. If the message is
classified as Spam, bots will report it as “Not Spam”, prolonging the














Figure 3: Timeseries of Spam and Not Spam votes cast on a likely
spammer IP address over 19 days. Fraudulent voters need to cast
fewer votes to annul the “spam” classification of a message.
To make detection more difficult, botmasters do not typi-
cally use voting bots to send spam, which maximizes the
number of “not spam” votes that each voting bot can cast
before being detected. Figure 3 shows an example of the
series of votes cast on messages sent by a likely spammer
IP address over the course of 19 days at a large Web mail
provider.
3. Modeling Vote Gaming Attacks
In this section, we develop a model for vote gaming at-
tacks and explain how the behavior of accounts used for
vote gaming differ from that of legitimate users.
Consider a dataset that consists of:
• a set of “Not Spam” (NS) votes,
• the identities of the users who cast the votes ({U})
• the IP addresses that sent messages on which these
votes were cast ({P}).
We can represent voting as a bipartite graph, where each
NS vote is an edge from a user ID to an IP address, as
shown in Figure 4. In practice, this dataset is unlabeled
(i.e., identities of the bots and spammers are unknown)
even though they are labeled in the figure for clarity.
Two properties of vote gaming attacks help detection:
1. Volume: Compromised user accounts cast NS votes
to many different IP addresses
2. Collusion: Spammer IP addresses receive “not
spam” votes from many different compromised ac-
counts.
Of course, legitimate users also cast NS votes, and a le-
gitimate user may also incorrectly cast a NS vote on a spam
sender. Legitimate users may also cast many NS votes, ei-
ther because they receive a large amount of email, or per-
haps because they have subscribed to mailing lists whose
messages are frequently marked as spam by other users.
However, legitimate users tend to not cast collections of
NS votes on a specific set of IP addresses, because it is
extremely unlikely for multiple legitimate users to receive
a spam message from the same IP address and proceed to
vote NS on the same message. Thus, in combination with
the second feature—that a large fraction of IP addresses
that a bot votes on will also be voted on by other bot
accounts—we can detect compromised accounts with very
few false positives. Because legitimate users do not cast
NS votes on messages because of the IP that sent the mes-
sage, they are unlikely to share a large set of their voted-on
IPs with other legitimate users.
Using these insights, we can apply unsupervised learn-
ing to the model of voting data to extract sets of likely gam-
ing accounts. To enable unsupervised learning, we first
represent the bipartite graph as a document-feature matrix,
with user accounts as documents and the IP addresses that
are voted on as features. We then cluster accounts that
have high similarity with each other based on the number
of IP addresses they share. Section 4 describes our cluster-
ing approaches, and how it outperforms a similar approach
used in BotGraph [27].
Our detection methods rely on three assumptions:
A1 Compromising accounts is sufficiently costly to re-
quire spammers to reuse accounts in U .
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Figure 4: NS votes as a bipartite graph matching voting user IDs
({U}) to sender IP addresses ({P}). Dotted edges represent legiti-
mate NS votes; thick edges represent fraudulent NS votes. L: legiti-
mate voter/sender; B: bot voter; S: Spam sender.
A2 A single user ID in U can vote on a specific IP ad-
dress in P at most m times.
A3 The majority of votes on a spammer’s IP address are
“Spam” votes from legitimate users.
All of these assumptions typically hold in reality. A1 holds
because most Web mail providers follow a reputation sys-
tem with regards to voting. To prevent spammers from
creating large amounts of accounts and using them only
to cast NS votes, users need to build up a voting reputa-
tion in order to be accounted for. This requires spammers
to compromise existing accounts with good voting reputa-
tion, which is time-consuming. A2 holds because the Web
mail provider must reach a consensus across many users.
Thus, most providers only allow a few votes per IP address
(we assume m = 1). A3 holds because legitimate recip-
ients outnumber compromised accounts. This assumption
is inherent in the business model of spammers, who want
to reach as many users as possible and have fewer compro-
mised accounts than target “clients”. A3 implies that each
spammer must cast several NS votes to affect the consen-
sus for an IP address. If each compromised account can
only cast a single vote per IP address, to achieve a critical
number of NS votes, the spammer must cast multiple NS
votes from different accounts.
4. Detecting Vote Gaming Attacks
We now develop detection methods for vote gaming at-
tacks. We review an existing graph-based clustering al-
gorithm from Kumar et al. [16] and later applied in Bot-
Graph [27]. We explain why this approach is not optimal
for detecting vote gaming attacks; we then present a new
clustering approach using canopy-based clustering.
4.1 Problem: Clustering Voting Behavior
Figure 5 shows how we can represent a sample voting
graph as the input document-feature matrix M for a clus-
tering algorithm. Let U be the set of users who voted and
Figure 5: Representing the NS voting graph as an adjacency matrix.
Labels on edges represent the number of times a user votes on an IP.
P be the set of IPs they voted on. M ⊆ U × P , and each
M(i, j) denotes the number of votes given by user i to an
email sent from IP j. The matrix M consists of all users
who have voted and all IPs that have received a non-spam
vote. Our goal is to extract groups of fraudulent user iden-
tities from M with few false-positives.
Large email providers have tens of millions of active
users per month, and the number of voted-on IPs is on the
order of millions. We wish to identify the user IDs that
behave similarly by clustering in this high-dimensional
space. Our setting differs from conventional clustering se-
tups [12] in the following ways:
1. Lack of cluster structure. Unlike the usual settings
in which clustering is performed, there are no clear
clusters in our data. In fact, with a normal set of
users, two users will rarely receive emails from the
same IP, and even more rarely will they cast the same
vote on the same IP. Thus, any form of tightly con-
nected clusters in our data is a signal of anomaly—
as we shall see later, we instead end up with a large
number of clusters at various scales.
2. Sparsity. On average, users cast less than one non-
spam vote during the entire month, although we
also observe a significant number of users with large
numbers of non-spam votes.
3. Data scale. Our data has many users and IPs. While
many traditional clustering algorithms are quadratic
time, our data’s scale requires linear-time or near-
linear-time algorithms.
4. Adversarial nature. The data is generated adversar-
ially. The spammers can succeed only if they can re-
main undetected by the anti-spam filters. This means
that we rarely get spammers casting a large num-
ber of non-spam votes from the same ID. Instead,
campaigns to vote “Not Spam” are distributed over a
large number of user IDs.
These features make the choice of clustering algorithm and
distance metric critical. As a simple example, clustering
based on distance metrics such as the Euclidean metric
will erroneously show high similarity between IDs which
have few IPs in common as long as the common IPs have
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Figure 6: k-neighborhood representation of {U} from Figure 5.
high weight.1 Consequently, we need to develop clustering
strategies specifically for our problem setting.
4.2 Baseline: Graph-based Clustering
As a baseline for comparison, we apply a graph-based
clustering method that is similar to the technique intro-
duced by Kumar et al. [16] and later applied by Bot-
Graph [27]. We choose this algorithm to enable direct
comparison of methods used in previous work, and with
our second approach, canopy-based clustering. Kumar
et al. [16] proposed the k-neighborhood plot as a way
to study the similarities between entities using Web data.
Given a bipartite graph G = (A,B,E), Kumar et al. de-
fine the k-NC graph H corresponding to G as follows: H
is defined over the vertex set A; we include edge (u, u′) in
H if there exist k distinct nodes {v1 . . . vk} ⊆ B such that
for each i, both (u, vi) and (u
′, vi) are in G. Figure 6 il-
lustrates the construction of a k-neighborhood graph from
a bipartite graph. Zhao et al. use the same construct in
BotGraph to discover botnets by working with the bipar-
tite graph of users versus the Autonomous System (AS)
numbers of the IPs from which users log in [27]. We make
one improvement to the clustering approach in BotGraph:
rather than mapping user accounts to AS numbers, we map
them to IP addresses, since mapping user accounts to AS
numbers hides the fact that a user account is accessed from
multiple locations.
Efficiently finding a value for k. Two users voting NS on
the same k sender IPs is indicative of suspicious coordi-
nated behavior. The success of this approach depends on
efficiently finding a value of k that identifies a significant
number of attackers with no false positives. A low value
for k may retain some legitimate users in components that
mostly have bots. On the other hand, a high value for k
1Consider two vectors A = [1, 1, 1, 10], B = [0, 0, 0, 10], and C =
[1, 1, 1, 3]. The distance between A and B is dEuclidean(A,B) = 1.73,
although A and B have only one feature in common. The distance
dEuclidean(A,C) = 7.0, i.e., greater than dEuclidean(A,B), even though
A and C vote on the same set of IPs. The high-valued feature influences
the Euclidean metric more than, for example, the Jaccard metric.
produces components whose voting behaviors are highly
coordinated, although the sizes of the components—and
hence the number of bots identified—decrease.
A simple way to construct the k-NC graph for any fixed
value of k first creates the weighted graph G′ with vertex
set U where for each (u, u′) the weight w(u, u′) equals the
number of common neighbors of u and u′ in G. Then, we
can create the threshold using the value of k that we desire
and apply standard component finding algorithms. This
takes time O(min(|U |2, imax|E|)) where imax is the max-
imum number of users who vote on an IP. This approach
is infeasible when the size of |U | is on the order of tens
of millions, and imax is typically of the order of thousands
as well. For a fixed value of k, Kumar et al. [16] show
how to compute the k-NC graph in time O(n2−1/k) where
n = |U |, which is significant gain for small k. Our setting,
however, requires a larger k to ensure we do not create
edges between normal users and bot accounts so this algo-
rithm is impractical in our setting. Furthermore, as with
BotGraph [27], we need to run the component-finding al-
gorithm at various values of k to find the right threshold.
To create components at various thresholds, we have
developed a new technique using dynamic graph algo-
rithms for maintaining components under edge additions
and deletions. Although it is difficult to maintain compo-
nents under edge deletions, it is easier to do so under edge
additions. Thus, we start with a maximum value kmax,
find components with threshold k = kmax, and then de-
crease k by 1. At each step that we decrement k, the
graph gains a new set of edges, and these could change
the component structure by joining some previously dis-
connected components. Updating the component list effi-
ciently only requires maintaining a union-find data struc-
ture, and the whole process takes total time O(kmax(|U |+
|E|.α(E,U))), where α(E,U) is the inverse Ackermann
function, an extremely slow-growing function which is a
small value—less than 5—for almost all practical values
of |E| and |U |.
Graph-based Clustering Produces False Positives. The
most significant shortcoming of graph-based clustering
such as BotGraph [27] for detecting bot-controlled ac-
counts is its false positive rate, which are typically un-
acceptable for email. Intuitively, graph-based clustering
disconnects edges lower than a certain weight and labels
all nodes in a large connected component as bots; it does
not pay attention to the absolute degree of a node in a con-
nected component when compared with other nodes in the
component. This behavior produces false positives.
Figure 7 illustrates why graph-based clustering may pro-
duce false positives. The nodes (i.e., user accounts) shown
outside the cloud are legitimate, but the nodes inside the
cloud are controlled by bots. All the legitimate accounts
share two IP addresses between each other (e.g., perhaps
due to a company proxy server that cycles between two
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Figure 7: Shortcoming of graph-based clustering: one false-positive
edge can connect a bot component (shown within the cloud) to a num-
ber of unrelated, almost-disconnected legitimate users (outside the
cloud). Edge labels are the edge-weights. Here, the threshold k = 2.
public IP addresses), as shown by the edges with weight
two. Unfortunately, one legitimate user has also logged in
from two IP addresses that have bot programs running on
them. This scenario could be a false positive—for exam-
ple, the legitimate user’s IP address could have been re-
cycled with DHCP to a botted machine—or it could have
occurred accidentally, because the legitimate user has a bot
program on his computer while he continues to use it. In
either case, this legitimate user acts as a “bridge” that con-
nects a component of true voting bots, and a number of
legitimate users that would otherwise have been discon-
nected. A clustering algorithm based on pairwise similar-
ity comparisons is unlikely to make this mistake because
it would compare all-pairs similarity, and discover that the
true bots have a much higher similarity to each other than
other pairs. Although this particular false positive could
have been avoided by increasing the value of the threshold
k to 3, the BotGraph algorithm would stop the component
finding process at k = 2, because the component sizes be-
tween successive steps differs by an order of magnitude:
the component of 14 nodes breaks to a largest component
of 3 nodes if k is increased to 3.
4.3 Our Approach: Canopy-based Clustering
To reduce false positives and cope with high dimension-
ality, we adapt a two-stage clustering technique by McCal-
lum et al. called canopy clustering [17]. Canopy cluster-
ing is a divide-and-conquer approach for clustering high-
dimensional data sets. Canopy clustering is more practical
than graph-based clustering for detecting vote-gaming at-
tacks, because it produces fewer false positives and is more
scalable. The algorithm proceeds in two stages:
Step 1: Canopy Formation. First, we partition the raw
data into overlapping subsets called canopies, using an in-
expensive similarity metric and very few similarity com-
parisons. We construct canopies such that all elements
in a cluster in the output of a traditional clustering algo-
rithm will be within the same canopy. Thus, the second
stage of canopy clustering need only conduct more rigor-
ous similarity comparisons for elements that are within the
same canopy. Provided that the number of elements in the
largest canopies are much smaller than in the raw data, this
method typically reduces the number of expensive similar-
ity measurements by many orders of magnitude.
The choice of metric used to create the initial partition
of the raw data into canopies is important: a good metric
is inexpensive (i.e., does not involve operations such as
division or multiplication), and minimizes the size of the
largest canopy. Following McCallum et al.’s suggestion of
using the number of common features between elements as
an inexpensive metric, we use the number of common IPs
voted on by two users as our canopy metric. We explain
this metric in Section 6, and how its parameter settings
affect detection and false positive rates in Section 7.
Step 2: Conventional Clustering. The output of the
first step are canopies of tractable sizes, such that we
can directly perform clustering on each canopy. For
this stage, we use a well-known hierarchical clustering
scheme, greedy agglomerative clustering (GAC), using α-
Jaccard similarity2 as the metric. We choose GAC using
the Jaccard metric because it is appropriate for clustering
user IDs where the similarity metric should take into ac-
count the fraction of shared IPs. In Section 6, we introduce
an approximation of this method that works in a cluster
computing infrastructure such as Hadoop. We also discuss
how to parallelize this clustering using techniques from lo-
cality sensitive hashing [6].
GAC is an iterative method, where initially, each ele-
ment in the data set is in a cluster of its own. At each iter-
ation, we find the similarity between every pair of clusters
using the Jaccard metric, and merge the two clusters that
are the most similar to each other, provided this similar-
ity is greater than a threshold, α. We compute the Jaccard
metric between two clusters using the mean distance be-
tween elements in the cluster. If C1 and C2 are two clusters









Iteration stops when either (1) only a single cluster re-
mains, or (2) the similarity between the two most-similar
clusters is less than α. Because canopies are overlapping,
an element may be clustered into multiple clusters. To re-
solve this issue, after we perform GAC on each canopy
independently, we assign any element that is in multiple
clusters solely to the largest cluster; we find that this choice
does not incur false positives because most large clusters
are likely comprised of bot accounts.
5. Evaluation
2Let x and y be two user identities, with X and Y representing the sets of
IP addresses on which they voted “not spam”. x and y will be clustered
together only if
|X ∩ Y |
|X ∪ Y |
≥ α
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Figure 8: Workflow for finding and validating fraudulent voters from
unlabeled voting data.
We evaluate the accuracy and precision of the clustering
algorithms for detecting vote gaming attacks. Section 5.1
describes our dataset; Section 5.2 describes the metrics
used to evaluate the quality of the clustering algorithms,
and presents the basic performance of each algorithm for
identifying vote gaming attacks. Figure 8 explains the
workflow of our evaluation and validation technique.
Main Result. Although both canopy-based greedy ag-
glomerative clustering (GAC) and graph-based clustering
both can detect vote gaming attacks, GAC has a higher de-
tection rate (10% vs. 3%) and a lower false positive rate
(0.17% vs. 1.09%). (Section 5.2, Table 2)
5.1 Data
Our dataset consists of the logs of votes cast by the users
of a large Web mail service provider on mail that they re-
ceive, extending for four months from July–October 2009.
Each line corresponds to one vote; the fields included are:
(1) the ID of the user who cast the vote, (2) the IP address
of the sender of the email on which the vote was cast (the
“voted-on” IP), and (3) the type of vote—“S” for spam
and “NS” for not spam. Section 6 describes the filtering
stage of our workflow.
To validate whether the clusters of voters we obtain con-
tain bots, we use independent labels of known fraudulent
voters. To evaluate the percentage of false positives, we
use a list of users known to engage in reputable behav-
ior; this list contains users who have long-standing ac-
counts with the provider, or users who have purchased
items from e-commerce sites also owned by the provider’s
parent company. Because the set of labeled users was col-
lated independently by the anti-spam team at the large Web
mail provider, only a subset of these labeled accounts in-
tersect with our 4-month dataset of NS votes.
Table 1 summarizes the voting dataset and its intersec-
tion with user labels. We have observed empirically that,
although some NS votes are legitimate (e.g., there are cases
Period 4 months (Jul.–Oct. 2009)
Total Voting Users 35 million
→֒ Total only-NS voters 39.8%
→֒ Users labeled “good” 3.71%
→֒ only-NS voters 1.76%
→֒ Users labeled “bad” 6.91%
→֒ only-NS voters 6.82%
Total Spam votes 357 million
Total Not-spam votes 82 million
→֒ By only-NS voters 63%
Voted-on IPs 5.1 million
→֒ Voted-on as NS 1.7 million
Table 1: Description of voting dataset.
Method Median size Detection FP rate
Canopy Clustering 109 10.24% 0.17%
Graph-based 32 3.51% 1.09%
Table 2: Comparison of Greedy Agglomerative Clustering (GAC)
and Graph-based clustering that shows the median cluster (or com-
ponent) size, and the associated detection and false positive rates.
where a legitimate email contained keywords that trig-
gered a content filter for spam), the majority of NS votes
are performed by bots to delay the identification of spam
sent by other bots: 63% of NS votes are cast by users who
only cast NS votes. Although we derive data labels using
independent verification methods (e.g., manual inspection,
suspicious account activity), these labels can often only
be attributed to the users after they have performed a sig-
nificant amount of malicious activity and have been de-
activated. Our goal is to identify as many undiscovered
fraudulent voters as possible, so we use accounts that are
labeled after the time period during which we evaluate our
clustering methods.
5.2 Detection and False Positive Rates
Our aim is to identify large groups of bots without in-
curring many false positives. Thus, we compare the two
techniques in terms of two metrics: (1) detection rate, i.e.,
the fraction of users labeled “bad” (i.e., fraudulent voters)
who are classified into clusters larger than the xth per-
centile cluster size (x being variable), and (2) false posi-
tives (FPs), which we quantify as the ratio of good users
in clusters larger than the xth percentile cluster size to all
good users, for various values of x. Table 2 presents these
statistics for the median (i.e., x = 0.5) cluster size, and
Figure 9 shows the detection and FP rates for various per-
centile values (x). Neither GAC nor graph-based cluster-
ing vary much in terms of detection or false positive rates
with respect to x; thus, even a small-sized cluster is likely
to contain mostly bots. Graph-based clustering results use
k = 5, and canopy-based GAC uses a Jaccard similar-
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Figure 9: Performance of GAC and Graph-based clustering for vari-
ous percentiles of cluster/component sizes. The x-axis shows the per-
centile cluster size above which all clusters are considered to contain
only bots. The y-axis shows the detection and false positive rates.
choices for both algorithms in detail.
Canopy-based GAC outperforms graph-based clustering
in terms of both the detection rate and the false positive
rate. GAC performs better because, as explained in Fig-
ure 7, it is more precise than graph-based clustering. In
graph-based clustering, a large connected component at
some k may contain two or more sub-components which
are connected only by an edge of weight exactly k. Even
if the users in one sub-component do not vote on the same
IPs as users in the other, they will be categorized into one
large component, potentially increasing false positives if
some of these users are legitimate. GAC performs all-
pairs similarity comparison between users, which results
in clusters where all users are similar to one another.
One of the top three large Web mail providers is us-
ing our detection technique in production. Although a
10% detection rate may seem low, even single-percentage-
point gains are significant for a for large-scale Web mail
providers, given the high volumes of spam seen by Web
mail providers. Any increase in detection rates can help
these providers make more accurate decisions about which
email connection attempts to reject early, and which mail
can be more quickly and efficiently classified as spam (e.g.,
without inspecting the message’s contents); indeed, clus-
tering is being applied in practice at the large Web mail
provider to detect fraudulent voters. Our techniques also
identified fraudulent voters more quickly than other meth-
ods: many of the bots we discovered were identified by the
anti-spam team as bots only well after our dataset was col-
lected. We also note that the actual detection rate may be
higher that 10% in practice, because at least some of the
users labeled “bad” may have had the bulk of their mali-
cious activity before or after the time period of our dataset.
6. Scalable Distributed Implementation
We describe scalable implementations of the distributed
graph-based clustering (Section 6.2) and canopy-based
clustering (Section 6.3). We evaluate the performance of
the two methods in Section 6.4.
Main Result. Both implementations run on our 4-month
dataset in only a few hours, making it practical to run on
a sliding window that includes new voting data. GAC is
slower than graph-based clustering due to the overhead of
all-pairs comparisons (Section 6.4, Table 3).
6.1 Overview
At the scale of large Web mail providers, raw voting
data totals tens of millions of unique identities that map
to millions of IP addresses. At this scale, analyzing data
on a single machine is often infeasible. Many large orga-
nizations such as Yahoo!, Google, and Microsoft use dis-
tributed computing to analyze Web-scale datasets, by stor-
ing the data on distributed filesystems and using methods
such as MapReduce [4] to process them.
MapReduce is appropriate for tasks that are inherently
parallelizable, such as searching and sorting, but solv-
ing clustering tasks using MapReduce poses a number of
challenges. First, because individual rows of the matrix
M may be split across different mappers and reducers,
MapReduce clustering algorithms often take many itera-
tions to converge to a high-quality clustering. Second, be-
tween each iteration of clustering, there could be a large
amount of inter-node communication in the distributed
filesystem as potentially similar rows of M are sent to
the same mapper/reducer. Finally, the intermediate out-
put containing the results of comparing every pair of rows
may sometimes be much larger than the raw dataset. Al-
though some clustering algorithms, such as k-means [12],
are parallelizable, they are ill-suited for our problem.3
Unfortunately, our clustering algorithms expect a shared-
memory architecture and are not inherently parallelizable.
Below, we present efficient approaches to implementing
both graph-based clustering and canopy-based clustering
using MapReduce that trade off accuracy for efficiency.
6.2 Distributed Graph-based Clustering
Step 1: Creating an approximate user-user graph using
MapReduce. In a distributed infrastructure, computing
the k-neighborhood graph is challenging due to the amount
of intermediate output it generates. Suppose the original
bipartite graph is stored in the following format:
<user ID> <list of (IP, NS votes) pairs>
Because this file is split across many machines, the
straightforward approach to construct the k-neighborhood
3k-means, although widely applied, has flaws: (1) every point in the data
is forced into a cluster, which may affect the cluster quality if points are
outliers; (2) as mentioned before, the euclidean distance metric is both
expensive to compute, and gives weight to the larger-valued features than
the number of common features; (3) the number of clusters, k, may not
be easy to determine beforehand.
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graph uses two MapReduce iterations. The first iteration’s
Map phase outputs the inverse edge file where each line
has an IP address as the key and a user ID that voted on it
as the value. The Reduce phase will then collect all lines
with the same key and output all pairs of users who have
the same key. The second iteration counts the number of
time a specific user-user pair has been written out, which
yields the number of IPs shared between the two users—
the edge weight in the user-user graph. The main bottle-
neck in this process is the size of intermediate output be-
tween the two iterations: for example, an IP that has been






user entries, and when repeated for many high-degree IPs
can overflow even the terabytes of space on a distributed
filesystem.4
We apply approximations to filter the number of inter-
mediate user-user edges that must be output. We first fil-
ter users who have voted on very few IPs. Next, because
we are interested only in users who fall into large compo-
nents at reasonably high values of k, we suppress user-user
edges where the two users are unlikely to have many IPs
in common. To do so, we hash the IPs that are voted on by
a user into a fixed-size bit-vector, essentially a variant of a
count-min sketch [3]. Before outputting a user-user edge,
we compare the overlap between the two users’ bit vectors
and proceed only if the overlap is greater than a certain
threshold (which we set to lower than kmax because hash-
ing different IPs to a fixed-size bit vector could create col-
lisions). Similarly, when outputting all the user-user pairs
for a certain IP that has a large number—say p users, vot-





pairs, we select a
random subset of size αp and output them only. It is pos-
sible to tune the value of α with respect to the threshold
k desired to ensure that we do not break apart large con-
nected components in the resulting user-user graph.
Step 2: Finding connected components on the user-user
graph. Finding connected components using MapReduce
needs at least O(d) iterations, where d is the diameter of
the graph (i.e., maximum length shortest-path between any
two vertices). In this approach, the input is the edge file of
the user-user graph and a vertex-component mapping that
maps each vertex to its “component ID”, initially set to the
ID of the vertex itself. In each iteration, a mapper pro-
cesses each edge e(u, v) in the edge file and outputs two
lines < u, i > and < v, i > where i is the minimum com-
ponent ID of vertices u and v. This output becomes the
new vertex-component mapping. The process is repeated
until no vertex changes its component ID. In the case that
the set of vertices fits into memory, we can employ the al-
gorithms outlined in [14] to actually find components in a
constant number of passes.
4Zhao et al. also face this problem, but alleviate it using DryadLINQ [26]
that offers a “merge” capability to reduce intermediate output size; we use
the more widely-used MapReduce platform.
6.3 Distributed Canopy-based Clustering
Step 1: Creating Canopies. Although our dataset com-
prises tens of millions of user accounts that cast votes on
millions of IP addresses, the graph is sparsely connected.
Because the adjacency matrix M is sparse, we choose a
sparse matrix representation, M ′, where each row M ′(i)
is a set of t tuples, where t is the number of IP addresses
that ID i has cast votes on. M ′ is constructed such that, if
an entry (j, k) ∈ M ′(i), then M(i, j) = k.
We create canopies using an inexpensive similarity met-
ric and use the number of common IP addresses to measure
similarity between two rows of M . Adapting the method
by McCallum et al. [17], we first create an inverted in-
dex N that maps IP addresses to the set of users who vote
on them. To create a new canopy, we pick a random row
i from M and add it to the canopy as the first row. For
each non-zero column j in M(i), we find the other rows
in M that also vote on IP j using the row N(j). Using
the inverted index allows us to ignore all rows of M and
only compare with the rows from N(j). We use upper
and lower thresholds—Thigh and Tlow (Thigh > Tlow)—
to measure similarity: if the similarity of a given row in M
to M(i) is greater than Thigh, we remove the row from M
and add it to the canopy. If the similarity is less than Thigh
but greater than Tlow, we add the row to the canopy but
do not remove it from M . This procedure explains why
canopies can be overlapping: if a row is removed from
M , it will not be considered for inclusion in any more
canopies. In our implementation, we set Thigh to 7 and
Tlow to 5; i.e., a row is added to a canopy removed from
M if it has at least 5 rows in common with the first row in
the canopy, and it is also removed from M if it has at least
7 rows in common with the first row. We explain how we
obtain these numbers in Section 7.2.
Step 2: Greedy Agglomerative Clustering. After com-
puting canopies, we read each canopy and cluster only the
rows in that canopy. To reduce the workload, we skip
canopies smaller than 10 rows and canopies where the
first has fewer than two non-zero columns. We use the
average-linkage clustering metric to decide the similarity
between rows in a canopy. If a row is a member of mul-
tiple canopies, we include that row in the clustering in-
put for all canopies. In the final output, we include such
rows as members of the largest cluster among different
canopies. In a distributed setting such as MapReduce, ac-
curate canopy clustering can be quicker than an accurate
graph-based component-finding algorithm: provided the
largest canopy can be clustered by a single node, agglom-
erative clustering of canopies can be done entirely in par-
allel in one step, without involving the inter-node overhead
or the O(d) iterations of graph-based component-finding.
Although for our dataset, the naı̈ve implementation that
compares every pair of clusters within a canopy before
merging the two most similar clusters is sufficient, locality
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Method WC time Sys. time Max RSS
Graph-based 86.7 min 6.8 sec 5944 MB
→֒ Hadoop 14 min N.A. N.A
GAC 5.5 hrs 2.3 min 8221 MB
→֒ Canopy formation 30.1 min 2.7 sec 3109 MB
Table 3: Speed and memory consumption of our GAC and graph-
based clustering implementations. Times for graph-based cluster-
ing include the multiple iterations of finding connected components,
from k = 20 to k = 7. We could not measure the system time or RSS
for our Hadoop implementation.
sensitive hashing (LSH) makes this step faster [6]. With
LSH, we can create a hash-function on the vectors of the
IPs that two users vote on, such that with high probabil-
ity, two users with Jaccard coefficient above α are going
to fall in the same hash-bucket. The threshold α and the
probability desired will control the parameters of the hash-
function. We compare pairwise all user IDs that fall within
each bucket, and choose the most similar pair of IDs to
merge as one cluster. Once we form a new cluster by merg-
ing two user IDs, we can repeat the process using the vec-
tor representation of the new cluster using the same hash
function. This process ensures that at any step, we find the
nearest neighbors with high probability.
6.4 Comparison: Clustering Speed
To evaluate the speed of each approach, we implemented
and tested each approach on an unloaded 8-core Intel Xeon
2Ghz machine (4MB L2 cache) with 36GB of main mem-
ory running Linux 2.6.32. Both implementations were
single-threaded. In addition, we tested our approximate
graph-based clustering implementation on a distributed
cluster using the Hadoop MapReduce framework. The in-
put was the edge file for the bipartite graph that maps users
to the IPs that they vote on.
Table 3 presents the times taken and maximum resident
set size for each method. Although GAC performs better
than graph-based clustering, GAC takes longer and con-
sumes more CPU time because of many all-pairs similar-
ity computations between users in a canopy. The GAC
phase does not require more memory consumption than
the canopy formation; the extra memory usage is likely
due to the memoization used to speed up our implementa-
tion. Canopy-based clustering can be easily parallellized,
so with a multi-threaded application, we expect to gain a
speedup proportional to the number of cores. Table 3 also
shows the large improvement in running time for our ap-
proximate graph-based clustering algorithm on a grid in-
frastructure such as Hadoop [11]. Although we could not
implement canopy clustering on the same infrastructure,
we expect a significant speedup for that method as well.
7. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we analyze the sensitivity of the detec-
tion and false positive rates for the algorithms evaluated in
Section 5.
Main Result. The effectiveness of both techniques de-
pends on parameter settings. Because graph-based clus-
tering has a single parameter (the neighborhood density,
k), its cluster sizes are more sensitive to the setting of k
(Section 7, Figure 10).
7.1 Graph-Based Clustering
Our goal is to find a value of k that yields clusters that
are as large as possible with few false positives. This task
is challenging: selecting the smallest value of k where the
largest component fragments might yield k = 2. How-
ever, k = 2 may not yield large components containing
only bots with no false positives, because to be in a con-
nected component at k = 2, a legitimate user only needs to
vote “not spam” on two IPs that a voting bot also votes on
as “not spam”; this event may occur either if a user votes
“not spam” by accident or because the voted-on IPs were
re-assigned during our data timeframe due to DHCP reas-
signment. Thus, instead of choosing the stopping value of
k only using the decrease in size of the largest component,
we stop when a large fraction of labeled users in the largest
components are known dishonest voters.
Figure 10 shows the number of components and the size
of the largest component as k increases from 1 to 19. As
Figure 10(a) shows that at k = 1, almost all nodes are
in a giant component that includes nearly all nodes in the
user-user graph, but just by increasing k to 2, the giant
component fragments from over 14.6 million nodes to just
52,006 nodes, and the number of components increases
from 30,225 to over 14.5 million. Figure 10(b) highlights
the decrease in the size of the largest component, echoing
the structure of the Web pages-vs.-ads bipartite graph in
Kumar et al.’s work [16].5
Even for low values of k, the largest component con-
sists mostly of “bad” users. Figure 11(a) shows how the
fraction of users labeled as fraudulent in the largest com-
ponent varies as a fraction of all labeled users, for various
values of k. Even at k = 2, the largest component has no
users labeled “good” (i.e., no false positives). This char-
acteristic holds as k increases: there are no false positive
“good” users in the largest component at any value of k
greater than two. However, the minimum component size
above which there are no false positives is dependent on
k. We examine the size of the largest component and the
fraction of dishonest voters in each component (among la-
beled users). Figure 11(b) shows the number of false pos-
itives in each component, rank-ordered by the size of the
5This work illustrates the similarity of Web pages based on the number of
advertisements they share; they found that sharing even 5 advertisements
did not say much about the connection between Web pages, but six or
more shared advertisements implied a stronger notion of similarity. Sim-
ilarly, we find that two users in the same component at k = 2 or k = 3
are not necessarily similar but connections at a slightly higher value of



















































(b) Size of the largest component.
Figure 10: Variation of the number of components and the size of the largest component as the value of k increases from 1 through 20. The
number of components do not increase much past k = 2, but the size of the largest component decreases exponentially from k = 2 to k = 8.

































Ratio of bad users to all labeled users
(a) Fraction of fraudulent voters in largest component at various k. A
































(b) Fraction of labeled users in each component that are dishonest, for
different component sizes and at different values of k. Low values on
the y-axis indicate a higher false positive rate.
Figure 11: (a) Fraction of “bad” users in the largest component as k is varied; and (b) the fraction of “bad” users as component size varies
for two specific values of k. The largest component only contains users labeled “bad” above k = 2, but there is higher variability in the false
positive rate for smaller-sized components at k = 2 than at k = 5.
component, for k = 2 and k = 5. Smaller components
for small values of k often include many “good” users; at
k = 2, even the second-largest component contains more
than half good users. As we increase k to 5, the good-
user portion of the large component fragments, resulting in
smaller components with even fewer false positives, which
is why we picked this threshold for our evaluation.
7.2 Canopy-Based Clustering
Choosing thresholds for canopy formation. The first
step in canopy-based agglomerative clustering is canopy
formation, which is parameterized by the thresholds Thigh
and Tlow (Section 6.3). These thresholds control the extent
to which the data is partitioned and the extent to which
canopies overlap with one another. Because we apply
canopy clustering to reduce the size of our input dataset,
we must pick values of Thigh and Tlow such that: (1) the
average size of canopies are reduced, (2) the overlap be-
tween canopies is reduced, and (3) the total number of
canopies are reduced. Low values of Thigh reduce over-
lap, and high values of Tlow decrease the size of canopies.
However, if both Thigh and Tlow are too large, all but
highly similar rows will be in non-singleton canopies.
Figure 12(a) plots the size distribution of canopies on
varying Thigh and Tlow, and Figure 12(b) plots the CDF
of the user IDs which are mapped onto multiple canopies.
These figures show that setting Thigh = 7 and Tlow = 5
partitions the users into distinct canopies into a few small









Table 4: Sensitivity of the detection and false positive rates to the
choice of the similarity threshold. We chose 0.85 (highlighted).
canopies with minimal overlap.
Choosing a threshold for the Jaccard Metric. We clus-
ter each canopy using average-linkage similarity (Sec-
tion 4.3). For each canopy, GAC iteratively performs all-
pairs similarity computation and merges the most simi-
lar clusters if their Jaccard similarity exceeds a similar-
ity threshold. Table 4 shows how the detection rate and
false positive rates change for other settings of the similar-
ity threshold. A similarity threshold of 0.85 yields a high
detection rate and a low false positive rate.
Figure 13(a) shows the size distribution of the clusters
we obtained. More than 99% of clusters are singletons
(i.e., likely legitimate users). Figure 13(b) shows the dis-
tribution of dishonest voters for various cluster sizes, pre-
sented as a fraction of labeled users in the cluster. All large
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Hi = 2, Lo = 1
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Number of canopies to which a UID belongs
Hi = 7, Lo = 5
Hi = 5, Lo = 4
Hi = 3, Lo = 2
Hi = 3, Lo = 1
Hi = 2, Lo = 1
(b) The number of canopies to which a given user ID belongs, for
different threshold settings.
Figure 12: Canopy characteristics for various upper and lower thresholds, Thigh and Tlow .
exception—a cluster of 12,890 users—has 517 users la-
beled “good” 2,776 users labeled “bad”. Considering that
all of these false positives fall into a single cluster, these
users are likely compromised users that were mislabeled.
8. Related Work
Yahoo! Mail, Hotmail, and Gmail now each have hun-
dreds of millions of users. Because Web mail providers
started adopting and inventing schemes to prevent or limit
botnet-generated spam such as Sender Policy Framework
(SPF) [10] and DomainKeys Identified mail (DKIM) [5],
the amount of messages verifiable via SPF or DKIM also
increased as users migrated to Web mail. Thus, emails
sent by bots with fake or nonexistent verification parame-
ters (e.g., a bot masquerading as a ‘@yahoo.com’ sender)
became simple to identify and drop early in the pipeline.
Unfortunately, spammers can defeat DKIM or SPF by
sending mail through compromised Web mail accounts.
The numbers of compromised Web mail accounts, and the
amount of spam sent through Web mail providers have
continued to increase: Malware was found as early as 2007
that targeted Web mail in order to automatically create ac-
counts [24]. Microsoft reports that it discovered at least 26
million compromised accounts in Hotmail in 2008 [27].
Researchers have used clustering to identify bots us-
ing network-level features from spam and legitimate
email [22], and long-lived network-aware clusters formed
by spammer IP address prefixes to mitigate spam [23].
Qian et al. improve the network-aware cluster approach
with a hybrid clustering approach that includes both spam-
mer IP address and their DNS information [21]. Kumar et
al.’s study [16] presents the k-neighborhood graph model
we use in this paper, and its application to domains such
as relationships in social networks, collaborative blog-
ging or bookmarking sites, and Web page similarity. The
most similar work to ours is BotGraph, which identifies
compromised accounts in Hotmail using the graph-based
component-finding algorithm similar to the one described
in this paper [27]; our paper shows that graph-based com-
ponent finding has shortcomings for detection of vote gam-
ing attacks, since it generates false positives.
Clustering to find bots has also been applied in areas
other than email spam. Metwally et al. implemented sys-
tems [18, 19] to identify fraudulent publishers in the do-
main of web advertising. Their work attempts to efficiently
estimate similarity in the sets of IP addresses that click
on advertisements hosted a pair of publishers, and to clus-
ter publishers that have high similarity with each other—
which likely indicate fraudulent publishers. In the area
of scam hosting, Konte et al. show that many different
scammer domain names share the same hosting infrastruc-
ture [15]. Perdisci et al. have extended this work in using
clustering to identify scam-hosting domain names that use
DNS fast-flux to cycle between IP addresses [20].
9. Discussion
We present the results of identifying voting bots using
a complementary dataset, where we map user accounts to
the login IP address of the user who cast a not-spam vote
(i.e., the IP address of the host from which the user logged
in to the Web mail service). We also discuss potential lim-
itations of our approach and our evaluation.
Clustering Using Login IPs. We have an additional
dataset from May–June 2009 that has the login IP address
of the user (recall that the dataset in Section 5.1 has the IP
address of the sender of the email on which the user cast a
vote). We expect that the IP addresses from which a dis-
honest NS-voting user logs in should also follow the model
of Section 3. Table 5 summarizes the results of graph-
based clustering applied to the graph that maps user IDs
to these login-IPs. Indeed, a large number of IP addresses
shared a given bot account (specifically, larger on average
than the number of IP addresses a bot account votes on);
hence, a higher neighborhood density of k = 8 yields the
best results. As expected, most users in the largest com-
ponents were identified as bot-controlled. Certain compo-
nents have significant fractions of accounts not yet labeled
(e.g., the third-largest component has 55% accounts not yet
labeled), which represents significant savings in terms of
the number of fraudulent NS votes that can be prevented.
Because we only had access to this data for a limited time,
we were unable to compare the results of graph-based clus-
tering with canopy-based clustering.











































(b) Distribution of dishonest voters in clusters as a fraction of all la-
beled users.
Figure 13: Analysis of Greedy Agglomerative Clustering: (a) shows that over 99% of clusters are singletons, and (b) shows that in the
clustering output at our chosen parameter settings, most clusters over size 2 (with very few exceptions, as explained in text) have only users
that are labeled “bad”.
Users IPs Validated as Voting Bots NS Votes
102991 56 102991 (100%) 6.11m
69710 32 64629 (92.7%) 5.14m
59077 39 26592 (45%) 2.58m
49045 65 49045 (100%) 4.5m
Table 5: Results of applying graph-based clustering on login IP data,
and extracting the largest 4 components. Because this dataset has
different characteristics than our primary 4-month dataset, we found
that a neighborhood density of k = 8 gave the best results.
may appear low, this number amounts to nearly 26,000
fraudulent voters that were previously undetected by other
methods, with only 0.17% false positives. As the sensi-
tivity analysis in Table 4 illustrates, if the operators find a
slightly higher false positive rate of 0.5% acceptable, they
can detect up to 23.29% of the labeled bad users. Another
reason for this seemingly low detection rate is that many
users labeled “bad” in the set of labeled users may have
had the bulk of their NS votes before or after the time-
frame of our data set; such users will not have enough NS
voting activity to cluster well with other heavy NS voters.
As the false positive rate analysis in Figure 13(b) shows,
large clusters have zero false positives (with one excep-
tion that is likely due to mislabeling). Because these clus-
ters likely consist of only bot accounts, the actual number
of bot accounts detected by our technique will be much
greater. For example, the largest cluster in Figure 13(b)
alone has nearly 50,000 users, all of which are likely bots.
Dataset Limitations. Because the data that we used in our
study was not timestamps, we could not analyze datasets
on smaller timeframes. However, our analysis using lo-
gin IPs shows that smaller timescales also work to identify
voting bot accounts. Regardless, our approach can be used
for day-to-day detection of bots: because both clustering
methods complete in a few hours, an operator could run
the analysis daily on a sliding historical window of voting
data.
Using Voting Clusters for Real-time Detection. From
clusters of dishonest voting accounts, one can go back
to the original user-IP graph to retrieve the IP addresses
shared by users in the cluster. The IPs and user accounts
corresponding to large clusters can then be put on a “watch
list”, and any new users or IPs that map to a watched user
or IP can be investigated before they cause much damage.
A second avenue for using our approach in real-time filter-
ing is to combine information obtained using clustering to
improve other classifiers. Clustering extracts macroscopic
patterns from the activity graph of voting. A traditional
supervised classifier for voting would use features at the
level of each user (e.g., the user account’s age, it’s reputa-
tion, etc.) and might miss accounts that can be discovered
by clustering. As an example, consider a reputable user
account that becomes compromised and used for dishon-
est voting. The traditional classifier will likely continue to
classify the account as “good”, but our clustering approach
could instead discover that the account falls into large clus-
ters and raise an alert.
10. Conclusion
Web mail providers rely heavily on user votes to iden-
tify spam, so preserving the integrity of user voting is cru-
cial. We have studied a new attack on Web mail systems
that we call a vote gaming attack, whereby spammers use
compromised Web mail accounts to thwart Web mail oper-
ators’ attempts to identify spam based on user votes. Using
four months of voting data from a large Web mail provider,
we found that vote gaming attacks are prevalent in today’s
Web mail voting systems. As a first step towards defending
against these attacks, we have developed and implemented
a clustering-based detection method to identify fraudulent
voters. Our method identifies tens of thousands of previ-
ously undetectable dishonest voters over the course of sev-
eral months, while yielding almost no false positives. The
techniques presented in this paper are an important step in
stemming the tide of this new class of attacks and are al-
ready being used in production as part of a large Web mail
provider’s techniques to detect fraudulent votes. We be-
lieve that these techniques may also be applicable to other
online Web forums where bots perform vote gaming, such
as user-generated content sites or online polls. We intend
to explore the applicability of our methods to these other
settings as part of our future work.
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